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Minimum  income  policies  are  policies  aimed  at  guarantee  all  citizens  with  a 
minimum level of income and at fighting social exclusion typically associated 
with extreme poverty. Theoretically, their main shortcoming is the disincentive 
effect on labour market participation they could generate in the bottom part of 
income  distribution,  due  to  the  high  effective  marginal  tax  rate  they  impose 
around the threshold level. This paper employs a structural labor supply model 
under discrete choices to test the existence and the magnitude of this disincentive 
effect  on  Italian  female  labor  supply.  Our  empirical  results  show  that  family 
structure  is  crucial  in  determining  the  existence of  a  disincentive effect: only 
married women experience it, while single women participation rates increase 
under  all  possible  minimum  income  schemes.  The  magnitude  of  both  the 
positive and the negative effect depend on the policy design 
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 Introduction
The idea of guaranteeing every citizen with a minimum level of income goes
back in the history of philosophical, political and economic thought (among
others, Friedman, Tobin and Van Parijs) and, in the recent years, regained the
center of attention of the European political agenda1. On one side, in favour
of the minimum income idea there are motivations of redistribution, e¢ ciency
and cost-e⁄ectiveness. On the other side, its main theoretical shortcomings are
the disincentive e⁄ect to labour market participation at the bottom end of the
income distribution, due to the high e⁄ective marginal tax rate imposed near
the threshold level, and the level of taxation it would require in order to ￿nance
it.
In this paper, we focus our attention on the ￿rst critical argument against
minimum income policies: the labor disincentive e⁄ect. The problem arises from
the fact that, for a low wage individual, it could be more convenient, in the short-
run, to remain out of or even to leave the labour market in order to receive the
social transfer. Looking at the long run, minimum income policies could, in
principle, have the undesirable e⁄ect of creating welfare dependent families by
preventing some individuals from participating in the labour market. Moreover,
due to an income e⁄ect, individuals have no incentive to work if they can get
for free the same amount of money by the State.
We contribute to the existing literature by testing empirically the existence
and the magnitude of this labor disincentive e⁄ect. Therefore, we investigate
how labor participation would react to the introduction, in the Italian welfare
system, of a basic minimum income scheme. We focus our attention on female
labor supply because it is likely that the labor disincentive e⁄ect would concern
primarily women labor decisions, due to their higher ￿ exibility (as shown, for
Italy, by Colombino and Del Boca 1990 and, more in general, by Laroque and
2Salanie 2002 ). We choose Italy because it does not have a minimum income
policy and there is wide consensus among Italian economists and sociologists
that it would strongly need one to replace its highly fragmentary and work-
related actual welfare system (Sacchi 2005).
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1 brie￿ y introduces minimum
income scheme and reviews the existing literature. Section 2 describes the 2002
Italian tax and bene￿t system. Section 3 illustrates the data used and the
main descriptive statistics of the selected sample. Section 4 lays out the labour
supply model and section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 describes
the policy design and reports policy simulation results. Section 7 concludes.
I Minimum Income Policies
State intervention is primarily aimed at guaranteeing all citizens with a mini-
mum standard of living by means of both money transfers and in-kind services.
It could be divided in two main categories according to the criterion used to
distribute those bene￿ts (Targetti Lenti 2000).
The ￿rst category uses a universal selection principle: the role of the State
is mainly redistributive and each citizen derives bene￿ts regardless of individual
particulars. Thinking about money transfers, proposals like social dividend or
citizenship transfer belong to this type (see, for example, Van Parijs and Van-
derborght 2006). They are universal and unconditional transfers to all citizens
not included in the tax base; as an example, with a constant tax rate t, the
relation between disposable income Ypost , social transfer G and taxable income
Ypre is:
Ypost = G + (1 ￿ t)Ypre (1)
The public health care system and the state education system can be seen as
3examples of in-kind services belonging to this class of intervention.
The second category is based on a selective principle: the role of the State
is mainly residual and the bene￿ts are targeted to speci￿c groups of citizens,
like working people, or are means-tested. Typical examples belonging to this
category are minimum pensions, minimum income transfers and, in general, all
social policies aimed at ￿ghting poverty. They are realized mainly through a
negative income tax (NIT) scheme where individuals with a pretax income Ypre
higher than a certain threshold Y ￿ pay taxes on the exceeding part according to
the country￿ s tax rate structure. Instead, those who have an income Ypre below
Y ￿ pay no taxes and receive a money transfer G from the State to increase their
disposable income up to Y ￿. Considering again a tax system with a constant





Ypre + G with G = Y ￿ ￿ Ypre if Ypre<Y ￿
Y ￿ + (1 ￿ t)(Ypre ￿ Y ￿) if Ypre>Y ￿
(2)
NIT implicitly imposes a very high marginal tax rate on incomes around the
threshold Y ￿. A possible solution to avoid this problem is to weight pre-tax
income Ypre by a reduction rate t1 (lower than 12) and, consequently, to assign
to individuals with t1(Ypre) lower than Y ￿ a transfer G, not included in the
tax base, and make them pay taxes on income higher than Y
￿
t1 according to the





Ypre + G with G = Y ￿ ￿ t1(Ypre) if Ypre<Y
￿
t1






Theoretically, all these transfer schemes induce a labor disincentive e⁄ect for
those near the threshold Y ￿.
Minimum income schemes, whose main goal is to guarantee all citizens with a
4minimum level of income, can belong to both categories. Universal basic income
and universal basic wealth schemes are examples of the ￿rst category, since they
provide an unconditional transfer to all citizens. Workfare and participation ba-
sic income, instead, match the second category, since the transfer is conditioned
to individual characteristics. Participation basic income is probably the more
commonly used minimum income scheme. It is made up of two parts: a bene￿t
scheme, to supply individuals whose income is below a certain threshold with a
money transfer, and a participation program the individual has to carry out in
order not to lose the monetary side. All activities included in the participation
scheme are aimed at helping the individual back in to the labour market and
into society on a long term perspective. In workfare schemes, instead, the money
transfer is conditioned to a minimum amount of working hours. Workfare and
participation systems could be designed using a NIT scheme.
Most European countries already have some sort of minimum income policy,
mainly modelled as a participation scheme, while Italy does not have any. In
1998, a ￿rst experiment, the reddito minimo d￿ inserimento, was carried out on 39
municipalities over a period of two years to test the ￿nancial and organizational
feasibility of a national minimum income scheme. In 2001, without waiting
the evaluation results3, the ￿nancial law extended the experimentation period
by two more years and increased the number of cities involved up to 306. In
2003-2004 the minimum income experiment was declared over and in principle
the reddito di ultima istanza was created in its place, but, in practice, it never
actually happened. The reddito minimo d￿ inserimento was a participation basic
income mainly modelled on those already up and running in other European
countries. Every city had to manage the social side autonomously, while the
economic side was mainly ￿nanced and established by the central government
through the setting up of the eligibility rules and the income threshold, equal4
5to 282 euros per month (equivalent individual income was computed using the
ISE scale5).
The common solution to avoid the disincentive problem is to exclude part of
the labour earnings from the income considered to establish program eligibility.
For example, in France only
50%6 of individual earnings enter into the income taken into consideration
(Gurgand and Margolis 2005), while in Portugal the percentage increases up to
70% (Rodrigues 2003). In the reddito minimo d￿ inserimento, it was 75%.
Not many of the existing empirical studies on the relation between labor
supply and di⁄erent tax-bene￿t structures use a discrete choice approach.
Aaberge et al. 2004 examine the welfare and labor supply e⁄ects for Ital-
ian married couples of replacing the Italian tax system by three alternative
schemes: a ￿ at tax, a negative income tax and a work fare system. Whatever
the reform, labor supply of women in the poorest decile of the population always
increases. They explain this apparently counterintuitive result, opposite to the
labor disincentive e⁄ect hypothesis, using the own- and cross-wage elasticities
associated to the di⁄erent income groups and the quantity constraints on the
hours choice. Bargain and Orsini 2006 study the impact of two di⁄erent in-work
transfers in three di⁄erent European countries, namely France, Germany and
Finland, exploiting the di⁄erences in their existing tax-bene￿ts systems and in
the distributions of income and wages. When family transfers are considered,
they ￿nd that married women labor supply decreases, mainly due to the ￿scal
existing systems that penalize second earners, while single women labor supply
increases. When individual transfers are considered, instead, the labor supply
of all women increases. Blundell et al. 2000 consider the impact of working fam-
ilies￿tax credit on hours and participation in UK. They ￿nd that participation
among single women increases, while married women labor supply decreases.
6Very few empirical studies, to our knowledge, focus their attention on min-
imum income schemes. Gouveia and Rodrigues 2002, for example, study the
e⁄ect of the Portuguese Minimum income program on income distribution and
on government expenditures. Gurgand and Margolis 2005 analyze the mone-
tary work incentive faced by the recipients of the minimum income program in
France, i.e. the gap between the labor market income they can earn and the
welfare provision they can get. They ￿nd that almost all welfare bene￿ciaries
would gain from being employed rather than to stay on welfare but the size of
these gains is small and it is sensitive to the way in which the authors construct
the gains, in particular for single mothers.
Our contribution to the existing literature is to determine the existence and
the magnitude of the labor disincentive e⁄ect associated speci￿cally to public
transfers, since it is one of the two main theoretical argument against minimum
income policies. We concentrate on a single country, Italy, to be sure that our
results will not depend on di⁄erences in the tax structure, and we use a struc-
tural family labor supply model among a set of discrete choice model to account
for the fact that individuals face constraints on their possible working hours (
Dickens and Lundberg 1993, Van Soest 1995 ). In particular, we investigate
what would be the labor disincentive e⁄ect on Italian labour participation if
a social transfer like the one tested between 1998 and 2003 took place. The
focus on female employment is well documented in the literature, as shown by
Laroque and Salanie 2002. For Italy in particular, Colombino and Del Boca
1990 and Aaberge et al. 1999 show that female labour supply ￿ exibility and re-
sponsiveness are much higher with respect to male labour supply. Therefore, it
is likely that the labor disincentive e⁄ect would concern primarily female labor
participation. Italian female employment rate is among the lowest in Europe
(in 2006 it was equal to 46,6% while male employment rate was 70,7%) and far
7below the 60% established by Lisbon target. The potential detrimental e⁄ect
on female labor supply should, then, be a major concern when considering the
feasibility of an Italian minimum income scheme.
II The 2002 Italian Tax-Bene￿t System
The progressive income tax, IRPEF (Imposta sul reddito delle persone ￿siche),
represents the main source of revenue of the Italian tax system. The unit de-
termining the taxable income is the individual, while family composition a⁄ects
the tax liability by means of tax credits for dependent spouse and dependent
children. The tax base is mainly given by earnings (from employment, self-
employment or ￿rms) and income from real estate. Income from ￿nancial assets
is normally taxed separately. In 2002 the tax schedule was made by 5 brackets
with marginal rates going from 18% to 45%, as shown in table 2.1.
Final tax liability depends on a system of tax credits, generally decreasing
with family income, linked to the source of earned income and to dependent
relatives (table 2.2). Tax credit for earned income depends on whether the
individual is employed, self-employed or an entrepreneur and decreases with
taxable income. In 2002, for employed individuals, it varied from a maximum of
1.146,53 euros, for gross earnings lower than 6.197 euros, to a minimum of 51,65
euros, for gross earnings higher than 51.646 euros. For the self-employed and
entrepreneurs it was substantially lower and ranged from a maximum of 573,27
euros, for gross earnings lower than 4.700 euros, to a minimum of 51,65 euros,
8for gross earnings higher than 30.987 euros. Also the tax credit for a dependent
spouse decreases with liable income. To be eligible for this type of credit, the
spouse must have a personal income lower than a very modest threshold7 In
2002 it varied from a maximum of 546,18 euros for income lower than 15.493,71
euros to a minimum of 422,23 euros for income higher than 51.645,69 euros.
Finally, the third main form of tax credit is the one for dependent children: it
depends negatively on family income and positively on the number of children
within the family. The amount of credit can be shared by both parents if both
have taxable income. In 2002 it varied from a maximum of 546,18 to a minimum
of 285,08 euros. An additional ￿xed tax credit of 123,95 euros was given for each
baby younger than 3 years.
The Italian ￿scal system also includes two major social transfers linked to
the family income and structure (table 2.3). The "family allowance" is given
to employed or retired individuals that have at least one child younger than
18. "The family allowance for young children", instead, is given to families
that have at least three children younger than 18, irrespective of the claimant
employment status. The transfer amount and the income level for eligibility
increase according to the number of underage children and decrease with the
family income. Both requirements are systematically higher for single parents
than for couples.
9III The Data
The present empirical analysis is carried out using the 2002 Bank of Italy Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). SHIW provides detailed information
on a representative sample of the Italian population including micro data on
socioeconomic characteristics, labour and non-labour income and wealth of 8011
Italian families (21148 individuals).
Since we focus on female labor supply, we selected a sub-sample of women
between the age of 18 and 55, either employed or not. Individuals still in
education, self-employed or retired were excluded. The ￿nal selected sample is
made by 4227 women divided into two sub-groups: 2919 married women8 and
1308 single women, 388 of which living on their own and 920 living within the
parental household.
Descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples are shown in table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1 HERE
Married women are on average older (by 10 years) and less educated9 than
single women; 83,93 percent of them have at least one child, with an average
of 1,8 each, against the 12,38 percent of single women10, with an average of 1,5
each. 13,98 percent of married women have babies (children younger than 3),
while very few singles, among those who have children, have babies (less than
105 percent). Both married and single women are more likely to live in a house
they or their family own than to live in rented accommodation. More than 70
percent of single women still live with their original family.
Married women are less likely to participate in the labour market than sin-
gle women: less than 50 percent of married women work while more that 65
percent of single women are employed. By dividing the participation rate for
geographical areas, we observe that participation in the labour market for mar-
ried women is higher than 50 per cent in both northern (61 percent) and central
areas11 (52 percent), but the overall participation rate is forced down by the
very low rate in southern regions (only 26 percent). A similar path exists in
the sub-sample of single women where participation rates are very high both in
northern and central areas (respectively 85 percent and 76 percent) and under
50 percent only in southern regions (40 percent); participation rates are, in any
case, always higher than the corresponding ones in the married sub-sample.
Married women on average earn more than single women (slightly less than
8 euro per hour against slightly more than 7 euro per hour) and work a couple
of hours less per week. Everywhere apart from in southern regions, where the
ratios are pretty similar, part-time work, as shown in table 3.2, is more common
among married than among single women.
11IV The Labour Supply Model
The standard assumption in neoclassical models of labor supply is that individ-
uals can decide to work a number of hours equal to each positive real number.
However, in reality, individuals, most of the time, can choose between part-time
or full-time jobs with a predetermined number of working hours. To account for
this hours constraint, we use the discrete choice structural labor supply model
developed by Van Soest 1995.
In this model, each family can choose among L alternatives in the choice set
made by income and working hours combinations f(yl;hml;hfl);l = 1;2;:::;Lg;
where hml and hfl are working hours per week of husband and wife. Possible
working hours are multiple of some ￿xed interval length IL, creating a discrete
number of possible alternatives instead of a continuum as in neoclassical labour
supply models. Since the focus of this paper is female labour supply, we will
treat husband labour supply as ￿xed at the observed values12, reducing the
family choice set to combinations of family income and wife￿ s working hours.
We denote by yl family￿ s after tax income associated to the l alternative, made
up of husband￿ s earnings, wife￿ s earnings and family unearned income such as
capital income and social transfers. In the model what matters is how the
family budget set is determined by the wife￿ s working decisions, not its shape.
Therefore, nonlinear and large non-convex portions caused by the presence of
mean-tested social transfers are easily handled in this type of approach.
We use a translog speci￿cation of the direct utility function:
V (vq) = v0Av + b0v (4)
where vq = (logyq;loghqf)
0 is the vector of log commodities of the family
q and A, a 2x2 matrix with entries aij(i;j = 1;2); and b, a 1x2 vector with
12entries bi(i = 1;2); are parameters to be estimated. Preferences variations across
families due to observed characteristics can be incorporated through parameters




bikzk; i = 1;2 and ￿ij =
X
k
aijkzk i;j = 1;2 (5)
The z0
ks re￿ ect family characteristics such as family composition, wife￿ s age,
where the family lives, and include a constant term. In the empirical analysis, to
reduce computational burden, A will be assumed to be constant across families
and Zq will be a 1x12 vector. The ￿nal form of each family￿ s direct utility
function is:
V (logyq;loghqf) = ￿1 logyq + ￿2 loghqf + ￿11(logyq)2 +
+￿22(loghqf)2 + (￿12 + ￿21)logyq loghqf (6)
Family q disposable income corresponding to the l choice, yql, could be
expressed as a function T of family gross income and socio-demographic char-
acteristics:
yql = T(wqhfl;tql;Iq;Zq) (7)
where wqhfl are woman￿ s earnings, computed using the hourly gross wage
rate wq
13, Iq is the exogenous income, made up of household unearned income
and husband￿ s earnings, in the case of married women, or parents￿earnings, in
the case of single women living within the parental household, and tql are the
social transfers received by the family:
13The empirical analysis consists of estimating preferences directly as revealed
by individual choices, rather than through the speci￿cation of the labour supply
function. Household q chooses one among L alternatives in the choice set. The
utility the household can derive from each alternative l is given by:
Uql = V (hfl;yql;Zq) + ￿ql (8)
where V () is the utility function de￿ned in equation 6 and ￿ql is an error
term14 assumed to be identically and independently distributed across alterna-
tives and across families according to a type I-extreme value distribution. Under
this assumption, McFadden 1974 proved that the probability that alternative n
is chosen by household q is given by:






that leads to the estimation of a conditional logit model.
Italy, as many countries, shows a concentration of people around the part-
time, full-time and non-working alternatives. The above outlined model is not
able to replicate these peaks. Therefore, to improve the ￿t of the model, it
is common practice to add either dummies (as in Van Soest 1995), that can
re￿ ects quantity constraints on the demand side, or a ￿xed costs variable (as
in Bargain and Orsini 2006), that represents the direct and indirect costs an
individual has to cover to work (like transport costs and child-caring costs). We
use the ￿xed costs approach modelling them as a one-o⁄ weekly cost directly
subtracted from net income for any choice that involves paid work. They enter
in the utility comparison for each individual in their work - non work choice in
the following form:
14F = XF￿ (10)
Since we assume non stochastic ￿xed costs,they do not modify the likelihood





V (hl;yql;Zq) + ￿ql if hl = 0
V (hl;yql ￿ F;Zq) + ￿ql if hl > 0
(11)
In our sample, the working hours reported by individuals range practically
all integers from 0 to 70. It is, then, necessary to use a grouping rule that maps
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Figure 4.2: hours worked by single
women
Gigure 4.1 and 4.2 show the distribution of working hours in the selected
sample for single and married women, while ￿gure 4.3 presents the number of
hours worked by type of contract15. It is evident a strong concentration around
the full-time (30, 35 and 40 hours) peaks and a minor concentration around the




















G raphs by partime
Figure 5.3: hours worked by type of
contract
We use three di⁄erent grouping rules constructed using two interval lengths
(IL = 20 and IL = 10) and three set sizes (L = 3; L = 5, L = 6)16 to test if
our results are robust to di⁄erent choice sets.
Finally, a well known problem in the labour supply literature is that wages
are observed only for those actually working. Therefore, it is necessary to impute
a wage to individuals who are currently out of work taking into account the bias
linked to participation decisions.
A popular solution is to use the Heckman correction Heckman 1979. Strictly
speaking, Heckman corrected wages might induce a correlation between the
income and the utility stochastic component. Due to the selectivity problem,
individuals with a large positive stochastic component in the wage equation
are more likely to be observed in employment, given the observed variables;
therefore, the wage stochastic component and the utility stochastic component
become correlated. To ￿x this problem, di⁄erent solutions have been adopted,
all questionable to a certain degree: a) to use only the systematic component
of the wage equation for everyone; b) to use the observed wages for employed
individuals and the predicted wages for not employed; c) to use the predicted
wages for all individuals. A more sophisticated procedure, that avoids this
16correlation, simultaneously estimates the wage equation and the utility function
or, alternatively, integrates the likelihood with respect to the distribution of the
wage stochastic component.
We alternatively use all the four possible wages, the three above mentioned
possibilities based on the Heckman correction and a fourth possibility con-
structed using a numerical procedure to approximate the integration of the
likelihood with respect to the wage stochastic component17, to test whether the
Heckman procedure induce a bias in the labor supply coe¢ cients. The results
of the wage estimation are presented in the appendix.
V Empirical Results
Before looking at the empirical results, it is important to stress that they have to
be interpreted with caution as preferences of individuals in a static environment,
because this model does not explicitly take into account demand-side factors, as
rationing in disposable working hours, and factors that might in￿ uence individ-
uals￿behaviors and preferences in a dynamic perspective (Bargain and Orsini
2006).
We estimate utility parameter, as revealed by actual working choices, using
maximum likelihood. We allow ￿xed costs to vary according to the number of
hours worked (part-time, full-time or over-time). Moreover, we tried to interact
￿xed costs with some observable factors that in principle should raise or lower
their impact on individual choices (as the presence of young children within
the household or the region of residence) but all coe¢ cients di⁄erent from the
main one proved to be statistically not di⁄erent from zero, therefore we do
not include them in our simulation framework. The grouping rule based on
the type of contract (IL = 20;L = 3) was able to ￿t the data, in terms of
participation decisions, quite well without the introduction of the ￿xed costs
17variables, therefore we use them only in the other two cases based on the declared
number of working hours (IL = 10;L = 5 or L = 6).
For single women living with parents two possible types of family income
have been considered, to investigate if parents￿working situation a⁄ects co-
habiting children￿ s working decisions. The ￿rst possibility includes daughter￿ s
earnings, mother￿ s earnings, father￿ s earnings and family unearned income, while
the second type is made up of only daughter￿ s earnings and family unearned in-
come. Results for the two types of income are much the same, suggesting that
the parents￿earnings do not have a direct e⁄ect on daughter￿ s working decisions.
In the following, we present the results obtained using the income of the whole
family.
In our original sample, 51% of married women and 8% of single women
declared to be housewives. In our estimates, we want to control for the fact
that these women might have a strong preference towards the non working
status that can determine their participation decisions in a way not related
to economic reasons. We, then, include in the utility derived from working a
dummy variable equal to 1 if in the original dataset the woman is a housewife.
Finally, we want to control for the fact that poor families might have some
unobservable characteristics, like for example a poor social network, that might
in￿ uence their working choices. We create a dummy equal to 1 if, in the observed
data, the woman￿ s family has an income below a certain threshold and we
include it in the utility derived both from working and from income. In the
following we show the estimates obtained using the experimented minimum
income threshold18 as benchmark for the construction of the dummy variable.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 show the results for married and single women using two
out of three grouping rules19 (IL = 20, L = 3 and IL = 10, L = 5) and three
types of wages20. We omit the IL = 10, L = 6 because the coe¢ cients and the
18psedudo-R2 for L = 5 and L = 6 for both married and single women are the
same under all possible types of wages, implying that explicitly modelling the
overwork possibility does not improve the ability of the model to replicate real
choices.
For both married and single women, taste parameters associated with work-
ing hours are more signi￿cant than those associated with income independently
of the type of wage used. Signi￿cant coe¢ cients have the same sign under all
possible wages. Hours coe¢ cients are larger with IL = 10 than with IL = 20,
but this change in magnitude is mainly due to the presence of ￿xed costs. In
fact, hour coe¢ cients of the IL = 10 models without ￿xed costs are basically
equal to the IL = 20 case21.
Fixed costs are always strongly signi￿cant and vary according to the number
of hours worked. In particular, they decrease as the number of hours increases,
though the change is small with respect to the change in the number of hours.
This result suggests that only a small fraction of the cost of working is related
to the number of hours worked; the largest part is a sort of sunk cost related
only to the participation-non participation dichotomy.
In the case of married women, the main hours coe¢ cient is always negative,
as expected since we use working hours and not leisure time22, and strongly
signi￿cant. The number of children within the household has a positive impact
on the utility of working (it weakens the disutility derived from participation)
and a negative impact on the utility derived from income (signi￿cant in most
but not all of the tried speci￿cations). The latter e⁄ect could be related to the
fact that the higher the number of children within the household, the higher the
number of individuals competing for the same economic resources. A negative,
then reinforcing, e⁄ect on the utility linked to labor participation is associated
both with living in central and in southern regions, the latter being stronger
19than the former. Age shows the usual concave pattern but the coe¢ cients are
not statistically di⁄erent from zero. Under random wages, home ownership
reinforces the disutility derived from working. A possible explanation could
derive from the need of a second source of labour income to support or simply
to easier the refund of the loan most of the time associated with house purchases.
The housewife coe¢ cient is always negative, increasing the disutility derived
from working as expected, but it is not always signi￿cant23. Nevertheless, the
inclusion of this variable increases signi￿cantly the pseudo-R2 under all possibil-
ities, both for married and single women. To be below the threshold has always
a negative impact on the utility derived from income, but it is signi￿cant only
using corrected Heckman wages. It also has most of the time a negative, then
reinforcing, e⁄ect on the utility derived from working, but it is signi￿cant only
when no Heckman correction is considered. These two coe¢ cients are the only
ones not robust to the di⁄erent speci￿cations.
TABLE 5.1 HERE
The coe¢ cients for single women are similar to those already commented
for married women. Cohabiting with parents increases the disutility derived
from working. A possible interpretation could be related to the fact that single
cohabiting women face lower wages24, implying that they face less attractive
job o⁄ers. Another possibility is that single women that live with parents most
of the time do unpaid housework and, therefore, are less likely to get a paid job.
The e⁄ect of home ownership is insigni￿cant on the utility derived from working
but it has a negative e⁄ect on the utility derived from income. Also in the case
of single women, the housewife coe¢ cients is always negative but not always
signi￿cant. Both coe¢ cients related to the income threshold are negative and,
di⁄erently from married women, they are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero under
all possible wages.
20TABLE 5.2 HERE
An important characteristic of the model, to get reliable results on the sim-
ulation exercise, is its ability to replicate the actual data in terms of working
hours frequencies. To verify the ability of our di⁄erent speci￿cations to ￿t the
actual sample, we report in tables 5.3 the observed and the average predicted
frequencies.
All possible combinations of wages and choice sets ￿t the observed frequen-
cies of married women very well. Random wages tend to slightly overpredict
full-time work and to underpredict the non working status. All speci￿cations
are also able to replicate real working decisions of single women cohabiting
with their parents. The speci￿cations that use IL = 10 tend to overestimate
the intermediate solutions (10, 20 and 30 hours) and to underestimate the non
working status. As in the case of married women, when random wages are used
we get the worst scenario. Full-time work is strongly overpredicted while all the
other hours possibilities are underpredicted.
Finally, our model seems to fail in representing working decisions of single
women living alone. In fact, none of our speci￿cation is able to replicate exactly
real frequencies. All combinations of wages and choice sets overestimate full-
time (40 hours) and over-time work and underestimate all the other possibilities.
Heckman corrected wages generate frequencies more similar to the observed
ones.
TABLE 5.3 HERE
VI Policy Design and Simulation Results
In this section, we use our estimated labor supply coe¢ cients to simulate the
e⁄ect, on female labor decisions, of the introduction in the Italian welfare system
21of a minimum income policy shaped on the scheme carried out from 1998 to 2003.
The reddito minimo d￿ inserimento was a participation basic income made up
of a ￿nancial part, established by the central government and managed by the
local governments involved in the project, and of a participation scheme designed
and managed entirely by local governments. We are only able to simulate the
e⁄ects of the ￿nancial part of the program. The bene￿t scheme was mainly
characterized by three elements: the family reference income, the threshold
level and the labor earnings inclusion mechanism. The reference family income
for eligibility was made up of all family members￿taxable income plus one ￿fth
of household ￿nancial capital and one ￿fth of household real capital, calculated
using ISE rules. The eligibility income threshold was equal to 282 euros per
individual and it was adapted to family size and characteristics using, again,
ISE scale. Finally, only 75% of labor earnings of each family member was
included in the family reference income.
We test the existence and magnitude of the labor disincentive e⁄ect using
di⁄erent eligibility thresholds25 and di⁄erent levels of earnings inclusions On on
side, the lower the income threshold the more stringent the income constraint
should be and the higher the probability of loosing the transfer even if the
individual has a very poorly paid job. Therefore, the disincentive e⁄ect should
be weakened by an increase in the threshold level. On the other side, due to the
income e⁄ect, the higher the eligibility threshold, the higher the transfer and,
as a consequence, the higher the incentive individuals face not to work. Higher
eligibility thresholds should, then, reinforce the disincentive e⁄ect. Which e⁄ect
prevails is not a priori certain.
The earnings inclusion mechanism, instead, has a clear relation with the
disincentive e⁄ect. The higher the level of labor earnings included in the family
reference income, the stronger the e⁄ect should be.
22We try ￿ve di⁄erent income thresholds, set respectively equal to the ex-
perimented one, the minimum pension level, the absolute poverty line and the
relative (full and 80%) poverty line 26, and ￿ve di⁄erent levels of earnings in-
clusion, using from 75% up to 100% of each individual￿ s labour earnings.
Table 6.1 reports the ratio of individuals below the di⁄erent income thresh-
olds27. Single women living alone are the group that su⁄ers the most in terms
of income. In fact, it shows the highest percentage of individuals below the
threshold under all ￿ve possibilities. They are also the group that bene￿ts the
less from the actual welfare system.
Since family allowances and allowances for young children, based on the
2002 Italian tax-bene￿t system described in section 2, were included in family
unearned income used to estimate the model in the previous section, we also
include them in the status quo simulation. In the other scenarios they are
replaced by the di⁄erent types of minimum income transfers. We also include
a benchmark scenario where no social transfer is available. Tax credits for
dependent spouses and children have been maintained in all the simulations.
Table 6.228 shows the simulation results based on (IL = 20;L = 3) and type
I wages estimates, a model with a small, then rigid, choice set but a high ability
to replicate the observed working frequencies.
TABLE 6.2 HERE
For married women, the baseline case (the one without social transfers) is
23the worst in terms of labour participation rates, having the highest ratio of
individual in the non working status. This fact supports the idea that actual
social transfers are able to weaken the economic constraints that in poor couples
prevent women to participate in the labour market. When we look at the
minimum income scenarios, a disincentive e⁄ect comes out but the size is very
limited under all possible transfer schemes and it decreases as the threshold
level increases. The disincentive e⁄ect concerns more full-time work than part-
time work. Earnings inclusion does not have any e⁄ect on married women labor
supply decisions.
Results for single women are quite di⁄erent. For single women living with
parents, social transfers are linked to the whole family situation, including the
parents. What is, then, relevant is if by taking up a paid job, the daughter
will cause her family to lose the transfer it was entitled to receive. In this case,
we never observe a decrease in labor participation. Participation is positively
correlated with the income threshold and its increase is less pronounced when
higher ratio of labor earnings are included in the reference income. The same
results hold for single women living alone.
Minimum income transfers seem, then, to allow single women to work or
to work more. This result could be in￿ uenced by the fact that existing social
transfers and simulated minimum income policies reach di⁄erent targets. Exist-
ing social bene￿ts are mainly for families, implying that single individuals have
no access to them, while minimum income policies are designed for individuals
and adapted to family composition through the ISE system.
We run simulations using all possible combinations of choice sets and types
of wages. They all lead to the results we described above. A labor disincentive
e⁄ect exists only in the case of married women, but its size is very limited. The
income threshold has always a positive e⁄ect on female labor supply decisions,
24while the earnings inclusion mechanism has basically no e⁄ect. Our results, in
fact, hold under all possible earnings inclusion levels, even 100%. This suggests
that individuals, for their participation decisions, consider mainly the level of
the income threshold and do not take into account the fact that part of their
earnings might be excluded from the reference income.
VII Conclusions
Minimum income policies are often seen as an e⁄ective instrument to ￿ght
poverty and social exclusion. Their main weakness relies on the theoretical
disincentive e⁄ect on labour market participation they may cause at the bot-
tom end of the income distribution. The problem is that individuals with low
wages and not so attractive job perspectives could shortsightedly ￿nd it more
convenient to remain on purpose out of the labour market or even to become
unemployed in order to be included in the welfare programme. In the long run,
of course, this is a highly undesirable e⁄ect.
In this work we try to test the existence and the magnitude of this labor
disincentive e⁄ect by estimating a discrete choice structural labor supply model
on Italian data and, then, by simulating the e⁄ect of di⁄erent minimum income
schemes. Di⁄erently from the existing literature, we focus our attention on the
e⁄ect linked to the public transfer, isolating it from the e⁄ects due to changes
in the tax structure.
Our results suggest that it is not at all obvious that minimum income policies
have such a disincentive impact on employment, at least in the case of Italian
women. We considered di⁄erent groups of women (married women, singles living
with parents and singles living alone) and di⁄erent combinations of income
eligibility criteria and levels of labour earnings exemption. Theoretically, the
level of the income threshold has both a positive and a negative e⁄ect on labor
25decisions, while the level of earnings inclusion should has a negative e⁄ect. Our
results show that the mechanism of labour earnings inclusion, studied explicitly
to avoid the disincentive e⁄ect, seems to play no role in female participation
decisions. The level of the income threshold, instead, matters and has an overall
positive e⁄ect on participation decisions: the higher the level, the weaker the
disincentive e⁄ect. Moreover, this e⁄ect comes out only in the case of married
women, but it tends to weaken the higher the threshold used. Single women,
both living with parents and women living alone, always increase their labor
market participation when they receive a minimum income transfer.
Our results are in line with those of other existing studies (Aaberge et al.
2005, Bargain and Orsini 2006, Blundell et al. 2000) and suggest that single
and married women respond di⁄erently, in terms of labor decisions, to policy
measures. They also suggest that in Italy the actual welfare system seems to
bene￿t only married women, while a general transfer would reach single women
too, in particular those living alone. Since they are also the group more likely to
experience poverty, our results suggest that minimum income transfers would
allow them to decide more freely about their working hours by relaxing the
economic contraints they face. Further work is needed to verify if these results
hold also with di⁄erent tax structures and welfare systems.
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26Notes
1A 1992 European recommendation suggest that European governments should have some
sort of universal basic income mechanism.
2O⁄ course, if t1 = 1 we go back to the basic NIT structure with a 100% marginal tax rate
around the threshold.
3The evaluation process was, for the ￿rst time in Italy, assigned to an independent insti-
tution, but the results never became public.
4In 2002 money value.
5The ISE (Indicatore della situazione economica) scale allows us to calculate equivalent
income for families with di⁄erent characteristics. Starting from a weight equal to 1 for a
single member family, it increases by 0.35 for every additional member and by an additional
0.2 for particular situations such as single parents, couples where both parents work and
disabled children.
6With an upper limit of 750 working hours in 1998, now extended, after which all earnings
enter into the relevant income.
7In 2002 it was equal to 2.840,51 euros, meaning basically that he or she has not work on
a regular base.
8The term married refers to both spouses and cohabiting couples.
9Low level of education = less or equal to compulsory education; mid level of education =
high school or equivalent; high level of education = graduation or higher.
10In the SHIW survey, individuals reported as son/ daughter in the original family structure
provide no information on their own family (spouse and children). Therefore, married daugh-
ters have been excluded from the sample while the number of children for single daughters
has been set equal to zero by hypothesis.
11The northern area includes Valle d￿ Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto
Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna; the central area includes Toscana,
Umbria, Marche and Lazio; the southern area includes Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna.
1284,24% of husbands in our sample work. If we exclude retired husbands, the ratio goes
up to more than 94%.
13Which is assumed not to vary across alternatives.
14Error terms can be interpreted as unobserved alternative￿ s speci￿c utility components or
errors in perception of the alternative￿ s utility.
151= full-time, 2=part-time
2716First rule: L = 3 and IL = 20. Individuals are assigned to each alternative looking at
the type of contract they have. h = 20 if the individual works part-time and h = 40 if the
individual works full-time.
Second rule: L = 5 and IL = 10. Individuals are assigned to each alternative using
the declared working hours and the following classes: h = 0 if h ￿ 5 or missing, h = 10 if
5 < h ￿ 15, h = 20 if 15 < h ￿ 25, h = 30 if 25 < h ￿ 35 and h = 40 if h > 35.
Third choice: L = 6 and IL = 10. Individuals are assigned to each alternative using
the declared working hours and the following classes: h = 0 if h ￿ 5 or missing, h = 10 if
5 < h ￿ 15, h = 20 if 15 < h ￿ 25, h = 30 if 25 < h ￿ 35; h = 40 if 35 < h ￿ 45 and h = 50
if h > 45. Using this rule, we explicitly model overwork decisions.
The after-tax income yl is computed using the imputed working hours.
17See Van Soest 1995
18We create dummies for all ￿ve possible income thresholds showed in the next section and
we always get the same estimation results.
19Tables showing all results are available upon request.
20Type I = only the systematic part for all individuals; type II = observed wage for workers
and predicted wage for non-workers; type III = predicted wage for all individuals; type IV =
random wage for all individuals. In the last case, standard errors have been bootstrapped.
21Results are not shown but available upon request.
22We do not have time use data. As a consequence, we cannot divide non-working time
into leisure and time devoted to activities (like housekeeping) that could potentially produce
disutility. Therefore, we prefer to use working hours.
23Only in the IL = 20, type I wage and under random wages.
24See wage estimation results shown in the appendix.
25Of course di⁄erent thresholds imply di⁄erent total costs for the national ￿scal system, but
an analysis of the ￿scal sustainability of the di⁄erent possibilities is beyond the scope of this
paper. Our focus is simply to test the impact of di⁄erent thresholds on participation rates.
26Absolute poverty and relative poverty as calculated for year 2002 by Istat (see www.istat.it
for more information).
27As reference income, we consider the family income as computed using observed data.
28A=no social transfer; B=minimum income with experimented income threshold; C=minimum
income with minimum pension as income threshold; D=minimum income with absolute poverty
line as income threshold; E=minimum income with 80% of relative poverty line as income
threshold; F=minimum income with relative poverty line as income threshold.
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A Wage Estimates
Table A.1 and A.2 present the results of the Heckman procedure for gross and
net wages, separately for married and single women..Since SHIW reports only
information on net incomes it was necessary to recover gross wages using an ad
hoc microsimulation program 29.
The included variables could be divided into the following main categories :
￿ individual characteristics: age (divided by 10), age squared (divided by
30100) and educational level for both the selection and the main process;
￿ family characteristics: the number of children and the number of babies
(children younger than 3) within the household, the ownership or the rent
of the house, the area of residence (North, Centre or South), the presence
of grandparents in the household and the family unearned income (divided
by 100), and in the case of single women, a dummy equals to one when
she lives with her parents and zero otherwise;
￿ in the case of married women, husband characteristics related to his labour
income. We do not use directly the husband net labour income because
it is likely to be correlated to the wife￿ s wage, due to its dependence on
tax credits for children and family arrangement shared by the spouses.
To avoid this problem, the husband￿ s earnings are represented by the
husband￿ s level of education, type of job and working sector30.
Looking at the results for married women, all variables in the selection
process are statistically signi￿cant with the exception of house rental, having
a baby and family unearned income. Age seems not to have a direct e⁄ect
on wages but it has a strong positive e⁄ect on participation, decreasing with
woman￿ s age. Living in central and especially in southern regions lowers the
probability to work. Women that live in central Italy also have lower wages.
The educational level has an impact on both processes: the higher the educa-
tional level, the higher the probability that a woman will work and the higher
the wage she will get. The direct e⁄ect on wages is stronger than the one on
participation, especially in the case of gross wages. The greater gain in term of
earnings is generated by reaching graduation compared to all other educational
attainments, while the di⁄erence between high school and low level of education
is still statistically signi￿cant but much smaller. Having children lowers wife￿ s
participation rate independently from their age. Home ownership has a posi-
31tive e⁄ect on participation; a possible explanation could derive from the need
of a second source of labour income to support or simply to easier the refund
of the loan most of the time associated with house purchases. The husband￿ s
education has a positive e⁄ect on the wife￿ s participation; this e⁄ect could be
related to the assortative mating phenomenon. Namely, men with higher edu-
cation are likely to be married with women that also have a high education and
that, consequently, are more likely to work and to get high wages. Finally, the
husband￿ s working position31 has a negative impact on wife￿ s participation.
TABLE A.1 HERE
The coe¢ cients for single women are similar to those already commented for
married women. An interesting point is that single women living with parents
earn signi￿cantly less than the others. A possible explanation for this coe¢ cient
could be that, by living with their parents, these women face lower living costs
and, therefore, are able to accept jobs with lower wages (at least initially). Single
women that cohabit with parents also participate less in the labour market. A
possible explanation is that, most of the time, they are engaged in unpaid work
within the household and, therefore, are less likely to get an outside paid job,
unless strongly motivated.
TABLE A.1 HERE
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